I liked this. But afterwards the lecture strayed into what seemed to me controversial theology or metaphysics, “If being alone suffices to make you deserted, then say that Zeus Himself is deserted when the final fire comes round in its cycle, consuming the universe. Say that He bewails His loneliness exclaiming ‘Alas, me miserable3! I have no Hera now! No Athene! No Apollo! Not a single brother, son, or relation!’ Some people actually do assert that Zeus behaves like this in the final fire!” I gathered that he was attacking some philosophic4 tenet. But it did not interest me any more than his subsequent assertion—or rather assumption—that “Zeus[98] associates with Himself, reposes5 on Himself, and contemplates6 the nature of His own administration.” I have never felt drawn7 towards the conception of a self-admiring, or a solitary8 God.
Arrian’s next note bore on the peace of the universe, a peace proclaimed by the Logos, a peace resembling, but far surpassing, the peace proclaimed by the Emperor, such a peace that every man can say, even when he is alone, “Henceforth no evil can befall me. For me, robbers and earthquakes have no existence. All things are full of peace, full of tranquillity9. Whether I am travelling on the high road, or living in the city, whether in public assemblies or among private friends and neighbours, nothing can harm me. There is Another, not myself, who makes it His care to supply me with food. He it is that clothes me. He, not myself, gave me the perceptions of my body. He, not myself, bestowed10 on me the conceptions of my mind.”
Then followed a passage about death, which Arrian, during our last conversation, had marked for my special attention: “But if at any moment He ceases to supply you with the things needful for your existence, then take heed11! In that moment He is sounding the bugle12 for you to cease the conflict. He is saying to you, ‘Come!’ And whither? Into no land of terrors. Simply into that same region from which you entered into being. Into the company of such existences as are friendly and akin1 to you. Into the elements. Such part as was fire in you will depart into fire; such part of earth as was in you, into earth; such part of air or wind as was in you, into air or wind; of water, into water. No Hades! No Acheron! No Cocytus! No Pyriphlegethon! All things are full of Gods and d?mons!” By this I think he meant “good Gods and guardian13 angels.” He concluded thus, “Having such thoughts as these in his heart, looking up to the sun, the moon, and the stars, and enjoying the earth and the sea, man has no more right to call himself deserted than to call himself unhelped.”
It was not clear to me how I could continue to call myself “helped” when I was on the point of being dissolved into the four elements. If I were a criminal, successful in escaping[99] punishment on earth, I might deem it “help” (after a fashion) to know that I should be equally successful after quitting the earth, because I need not fear Hades and its three rivers as enemies. But where were the “friends”? The four elements promised but cold friendship! Arrian’s comment rose to my mind, and a second time I assented14 to it, “I cannot say that this satisfies me.” Epictetus was so averse15 from anything like cant16 or insincerity of expression that I was amazed—as I still am—that he could use, in such a context, the words “friendly and akin.” Surely Sappho’s cry was truer, when she wandered alone through the woods where she had once been loved by Phaon—
“This place is now dead dust. He was its life.”
What would it profit that my “fiery part” should return to fire? It might as well go astray into water, or earth, or into extinction17, as far as I cared. To be still loved would have been to be still in some kind of home. But who would love my four elements? I should be “not I,” but only four severed18 portions of what had once been “I,” fragments incapable19 even of mourning, wandering among “dead dust,” no better than “dead dust” themselves! How infinitely20 should I have preferred that Epictetus—if he could not honestly accept the confident hope of Socrates concerning a life after death,—should have said simply this, “As to what Zeus does with our souls after death, others think they know much. I know nothing, except that He does what is best.”
Reviewing passages in which Epictetus had mentioned the “soul,” I was more perplexed21 than ever. For in those he distinctly recognised the “soul” as “better than the flesh,” or “better than the body,” and as using the body as its instrument. When, therefore, he spoke22 of God as saying to man, “Come!” he ought to have supposed God to be addressing the whole man, soul as well as body, or perhaps the soul alone, (using the body, or the flesh, as its instrument). But if God said to the human soul “Come!” how could He go on to say “Such part as was fire in you” and so on, just as though we knew, without proof, that the soul was composed of nothing but fire, earth, air and[100] water? We knew no such thing. On the contrary, Epictetus continually assumed that we have within ourselves “mind” and “logos.” He also said that “The being of God” is “mind, knowledge, right logos.” Now he could hardly suppose that “mind” and “logos” were composed of fire, earth, air, and water. For my part, I did not feel that I knew anything certain about the distinctions between “mind,” “soul,” “logos” and “I.” But those who made distinctions appeared to me under an obligation to say what they meant by them.
It appeared to me that our Master had been inconsistent. As a rule, he dealt with each of us as having a soul that was our real self, and a body that was the tool of the soul. “Tyrants,” he would say, “can hurt your body but they cannot hurt you.” Might not a pupil of his go on consistently to say, “Death can kill your body but it cannot kill you”? This, at all events, was what Socrates meant, when he said, “As for me, Meletus could not hurt me.… He might kill, or banish23, or degrade,” for he certainly meant “kill” the body, not “kill” the soul.
Subsequently, when I came to read the Christian24 gospels, I found two of them making this distinction in the words, “Be not afraid of them that kill the body.” One of them added, “but cannot kill the soul,” the other added “but cannot do anything more.” Then I understood more clearly why Epictetus said nothing about what became of the soul after death. For these two Christian writers spoke of a possibility that the soul might be “destroyed in hell” or “cast into hell.” Now this was just what Epictetus did not himself believe, and wished to make others disbelieve. He preferred to give up the belief of Socrates that the good “go to the islands of the blessed” after death, rather than believe also that the bad go to a place of the accursed. Hence he dropped all thought of the essential part, or parts, of man, namely, the soul, mind, and logos, as soon as he came to speak of man’s death.
The consequence was that Epictetus confused us by an ambiguous use of “you.” As long as we were alive he said to us, “You must regard your body as a mere25 tool,” where by “you” he meant the incorporeal26 part of man. As soon as we[101] were on the point of death, he said to us, “Do not be alarmed. You are going into the four elements,” where by “you” he apparently28 meant our corporeal27 part. I felt sure then (as I do now) that he did not intend to confuse us. He seemed to me to have been confused by his own intense desire to persuade himself that men must do good without hope of any reward at all except the consciousness of doing good in this present life. I had not at that time read the Christian gospels; but several passages in Paul’s epistles occurred to me as contrary to this doctrine29 of Epictetus, and I thought that our Master might have been biassed30 in part by Paul (as Scaurus had suggested)—only not, in this instance, imitating Paul, but contradicting him. So I took up the epistle to the Romans intending to read what Paul said there about Christ’s death and resurrection.
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1
akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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reposes
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| v.将（手臂等）靠在某人（某物）上( repose的第三人称单数 ) | |
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contemplates
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的第三人称单数 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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12
bugle
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| n.军号，号角，喇叭；v.吹号，吹号召集 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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assented
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| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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cant
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| n.斜穿，黑话，猛扔 | |
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extinction
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| n.熄灭，消亡，消灭，灭绝，绝种 | |
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severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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banish
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| vt.放逐，驱逐；消除，排除 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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incorporeal
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| adj.非物质的，精神的 | |
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corporeal
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| adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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biassed
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| （统计试验中）结果偏倚的，有偏的 | |
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