The Multitude is Wiser and More Constant than a Prince
Nothing is more vain and more inconstant than the multitude, so our T. Livius and all other Historians affirm. For it often occurs in narrating1 the actions of men to observe the multitude to have condemned2 some one to death, and that same [multitude] afterwards weeping and very much wishing him back; as is seen the Roman people did in the case of Manlius Capitolinus, who, having condemned him to death, afterwards most earnestly desired him back. And the words of the author are these: As soon as they knew there was no peril3 from, they desired to have him back. And elsewhere, where he tells of the incidents which arose in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, nephew of Hiero, says: It is the nature of multitude, either to serve humbly4, or to dominate haughtily5. I do not know, in wanting to defend a thing which (as I have said) is accused by all writers, if I were to undertake a cause so hard and full of difficulty, that I would have either to abandon it in shame, or to go on with it burdensomely. But however it may be, I do not judge, or will ever judge, it to be a defect to defend any opinion with arguments, without wanting to employ either authority or force.
I say, therefore, the individual men, and especially Princes, can be accused of that defect which the writers accuse the multitudes; for anyone who is not controlled by the laws, will make the same errors as a loose multitude. And this can be easily observed, for there are and there have been many Princes, but of the good and wise ones there have been only a few, I say, of those Princes who have been able to break that restraint which could control them; among whom are not those Kings who arose in Egypt in that ancient period when that province was governed by laws, nor those who arose in Sparta, nor those who have risen in France in our times, which Kingdom is more regulated by laws than any other Kingdom of our times of which there is knowledge. And these Kingdoms which arise under such constitutions are not to be placed in that number whence the nature of each man individually has to be considered, and to see if he is like the multitude; for alongside them there ought to be placed a multitude controlled by laws in the same way as they [the Kings] were, and the same goodness will be found in them as we see in [the Kings], and we will see that they serve neither haughtily nor humbly; as was the Roman People, who while the Republic remained incorrupt, never served humbly or ruled insolently8, but rather with its institutions and Magistracies held its rank honorably. And when it was necessary to spring up against a powerful one who was harming them, they did so, as was seen with Manlius and the Ten, and others who sought to oppress them; and so also when it was necessary for the public safety to obey the Dictators and Consuls9. And if the Roman People desired Manlius Capitolinus after his death, it is not to be wondered at, for they desired his virtu, which had been such that the memory of them brought compassion10 to everyone, and would have had the power to cause that same result in any Prince, for it is the verdict of all writers that virtu is lauded11 and admired even in ones enemies: and if so much desire could have restored him, the Roman people would have given him the same judgment12 as they did when they took him from prison, a little before they condemned him to death: and as was also seen of Princes held to be wise, who have had some persons put to death and then greatly regretted it, as Alexander with Clitus and his other friends, and Herod with Mariamne: But that which our Historian says of the nature of the multitude, he does not say of those who were regulated by laws, such as were the Romans, but of an unbridled multitude, as was that of Syracuse, which made those errors which infuriated and unbridled men make, and as Alexander and Herod did in the abovementioned cases.
The nature of the multitude, therefore, is not to be blamed any more than that of Princes, for they all err6 equally when they all are able to err without control. Of which, in addition to what I have said, there are many examples, both from among the Roman Emperors and from among other Tyrants14 and Princes, where so much inconstancy and recklessness of life is observed, as is ever found in any multitude. I conclude therefore, contrary to the common opinion which says that the People, when they are Princes, are changeable and ungrateful, affirming that there are no more of these defects in them than there are in particular Princes: And to accuse the People and the Princes together can be the truth; but to except the Princes would be a deception15: For a People that commands and is well organized will be stable, prudent16, grateful, and not otherwise than a Prince, or even better than a Prince, although he be esteemed17 wise. And on the other hand, a Prince loosened from the [control] of the laws, will be ungrateful, inconstant, and more imprudent than a people. And that difference in their proceedings18 arises, not from the different nature, (for it is the same in everyone, and if there is an advantage for good, it is in the People) but from the more or less respect they have for the laws under which one and the other live. And whoever considers the Roman people will see that for four hundred years they have been enemies of the name of Royalty19 and lovers of glory and of the common good of their country: He will see so many examples employed by them which testify to the one thing and the other. And if anyone should allege20 to me the ingratitude21 that they [the Roman people] showed against Scipio, I will reply that which was discussed above at length on this subject, where it has been shown that people are less ungrateful than Princes. But as to prudence22 and stability, I say, that a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a Prince: And not without reason is the voice of the people like that of God, for a universal opinion is seen causes marvelous effects in its prognostication, so that it would seem that by some hidden virtu, evil or good is foreseen. As to the judging of things, it is rarely seen that when they hear two speakers who hold opposite views, if they are of equal virtu, they do not take up the the better opinion, and they are capable of seeing the truth in what they hear. And if (as has been said above) they err in things concerning bravery, or which appear useful, a Prince also errs23 many times in his own passions, which are much greater than those of the people. It will also be seen that in the election of their magistrates24, they make by far a better selection than a Prince, but a people will never be persuaded that it is better to bring to that dignity a man of infamous25 and corrupt7 habits: to which a Prince may be persuaded easily and in a thousand ways. It will be seen that when a people begin to hold a thing in horror, they remain in that opinion for many centuries, which is not seen in a Prince. And on both of these two things, the testimony26 of the Roman people will suffice for me, who, in so many hundreds of years, in so many elections of Consuls and Tribunes, they did not make four elections of which they had to repent27. And (as I have said) they held the name of Royalty in so much hatred28, that no obligation to any of its Citizens who should seize that title would enable him to escape the merited penalty. In addition to this, it will be seen that the Cities where the people are Princes, make the greatest progress in the shortest time and much greater than those who have always been under a Prince, as Rome did after the driving out of the Kings, and Athens did after they were free of Pisistratus. Which cannot arise except that those governments of the people are better than those of the Princes.
Nor do I want that there should be opposed to my opinion all that which our Historian has said in the aforementioned text and in any other; for if there should be discussed all the disorders29 of the People, all the disorders of the Princes, all the glories of the People, all those of the Princes, it will be seen that the People are far superior in goodness and in glory. And if Princes are superior to the people in instituting laws, forming civil governments, make new statutes30 and ordinances31, the People are so much superior in maintaining the institutions which will add to the glory of those who established them.
And in sum to epilogue this material, I say that the States of the Princes have lasted a long time, the States of the Republics have lasted a long time, and both have had need to be regulated by laws; for a Prince who can do what he wants is a madman, and a People which can do as it wants to is not wise. If, therefore, discussion is to be had of a Prince obligated by laws, and of a People unobligated by them, more virtu will be observed in the People than in Princes: if the discussion is to be had of both loosened [from such control], fewer errors will be observed in the People than in the Princes, and those that are fewer have the greater remedies: For a licentious32 and tumultuous People can be talked to by a good man, and can easily be returned to the good path: [but] there is no one who can talk to a Prince, nor is there any other remedy but steel [sword]. From which the conjecture33 can be made of the maladies of the one and the other: that if words are enough to cure the malady34 of the People, and that of the Prince needs the sword, there will never be anyone who will not judge that where the greater cure is required, they are where the greater errors exist. When a People is indeed unbridled, the foolishness that they do is not to be feared, nor is fear to be had of the present malady, but of that which can arise, a Tyrant13 being able to rise up amidst so much confusion. But the contrary happens in the case of bad Princes, where the present evil is feared, and there is hope for the future, men persuading themselves that the [termination] of their lives can make liberty spring up. Thus the difference between the one and the other is seen, that one concerns things that are, the other of things that will be. The cruelties of the multitude are [directed] against those whom they fear will oppose the common good, those of a Prince are [directed] against those whom he fears will oppose his own good. But the opinion against the People arises because everyone speaks evil of the people freely and without fear even while they reign35; of the Princes they talk with a thousand fears and a thousand apprehensions36. And it does not appear to me to be outside this subject (for this matter draws me there) to discuss in the following chapter whether alliances made with a Republic, or those made with a Prince, can be trusted.
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narrating
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| v.故事( narrate的现在分词 ) | |
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condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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humbly
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| adv. 恭顺地，谦卑地 | |
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haughtily
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| adv. 傲慢地, 高傲地 | |
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err
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| vi.犯错误，出差错 | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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insolently
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| adv.自豪地，自傲地 | |
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consuls
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| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
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compassion
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| n.同情，怜悯 | |
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lauded
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| v.称赞，赞美( laud的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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esteemed
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| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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royalty
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| n.皇家，皇族 | |
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allege
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| vt.宣称，申述，主张，断言 | |
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ingratitude
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| n.忘恩负义 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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errs
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| 犯错误，做错事( err的第三人称单数 ) | |
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magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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repent
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| v.悔悟，悔改，忏悔，后悔 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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statutes
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| 成文法( statute的名词复数 )； 法令； 法规； 章程 | |
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ordinances
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| n.条例，法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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licentious
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| adj.放纵的，淫乱的 | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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