License1 and Slavery peculiar2 defects in republican governments — Application of this reflection to the state of Florence — Giovanni di Bicci di’ Medici re-establishes the authority of his family — Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, endeavors to make amicable3 arrangements with the Florentines — Their jealousy4 of him — Precautionary measures against him — War declared — The Florentines are routed by the ducal forces.
Republican governments, more especially those imperfectly organized, frequently change their rulers and the form of their institutions; not by the influence of liberty or subjection, as many suppose, but by that of slavery and license; for with the nobility or the people, the ministers respectively of slavery or licentiousness6, only the name of liberty is in any estimation, neither of them choosing to be subject either to magistrates7 or laws. When, however, a good, wise, and powerful citizen appears (which is but seldom), who establishes ordinances8 capable of appeasing9 or restraining these contending dispositions10, so as to prevent them from doing mischief12, then the government may be called free, and its institutions firm and secure; for having good laws for its basis, and good regulations for carrying them into effect, it needs not, like others, the virtue13 of one man for its maintenance. With such excellent laws and institutions, many of those ancient republics, which were of long duration, were endowed. But these advantages are, and always have been, denied to those which frequently change from tyranny to license, or the reverse; because, from the powerful enemies which each condition creates itself, they neither have, nor can possess any stability; for tyranny cannot please the good, and license is offensive to the wise: the former may easily be productive of mischief, while the latter can scarcely be beneficial; in the former, the insolent14 have too much authority, and in the latter, the foolish; so that each requires for their welfare the virtue and the good fortune of some individual who may be removed by death, or become unserviceable by misfortune.
Hence, it appears, that the government which commenced in Florence at the death of Giorgio Scali, in 1381, was first sustained by the talents of Maso degli Albizzi, and then by those of Niccolo da Uzzano. The city remained tranquil15 from 1414 to 1422; for King Ladislaus was dead, and Lombardy divided into several parts; so that there was nothing either internal or external to occasion uneasiness. Next to Niccolo da Uzzano in authority, were Bartolomeo Valori, Neroni di Nigi, Rinaldo degli Albizzi, Neri di Gino, and Lapo Niccolini. The factions17 that arose from the quarrels of the Albizzi and the Ricci, and which were afterward18 so unhappily revived by Salvestro de’ Medici, were never extinguished; for though the party most favored by the rabble19 only continued three years, and in 1381 was put down, still, as it comprehended the greatest numerical proportion, it was never entirely20 extinct, though the frequent Balias and persecutions of its leaders from 1381 to 1400, reduced it almost to nothing. The first families that suffered in this way were the Alberti, the Ricci, and the Medici, which were frequently deprived both of men and money; and if any of them remained in the city, they were deprived of the honors of government. These oft-repeated acts of oppression humiliated21 the faction16, and almost annihilated22 it. Still, many retained the remembrance of the injuries they had received, and a desire of vengeance23 remained pent in their bosoms24, ungratified and unquenched. Those nobles of the people, or new nobility, who peaceably governed the city, committed two errors, which eventually caused the ruin of their party; the first was, that by long continuance in power they became insolent; the second, that the envy they entertained toward each other, and their uninterrupted possession of power, destroyed that vigilance over those who might injure them, which they ought to have exercised. Thus daily renewing the hatred25 of a mass of the people by their sinister26 proceedings27, and either negligent28 of the threatened dangers, because rendered fearless by prosperity, or encouraging them through mutual29 envy, they gave an opportunity to the family of the Medici to recover their influence. The first to do so was Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici, who having become one of the richest men, and being of a humane30 and benevolent31 disposition11, obtained the supreme32 magistracy by the consent of those in power. This circumstance gave so much gratification to the mass of the people (the multitude thinking they had now found a defender), that not without occasion the judicious33 of the party observed it with jealousy, for they perceived all the former feelings of the city revived. Niccolo da Uzzano did not fail to acquaint the other citizens with the matter, explaining to them how dangerous it was to aggrandize34 one who possessed35 so much influence; that it was easy to remedy an evil at its commencement, but exceedingly difficult after having allowed it to gather strength; and that Giovanni possessed several qualities far surpassing those of Salvestro. The associates of Niccolo were uninfluenced by his remarks; for they were jealous of his reputation, and desired to exalt36 some person, by means of whom he might be humbled37.
This was the state of Florence, in which opposing feelings began to be observable, when Filippo Visconti, second son of Giovanni Galeazzo, having, by the death of his brother, become master of all Lombardy, and thinking he might undertake almost anything, greatly desired to recover Genoa, which enjoyed freedom under the Dogiate of Tommaso da Campo Fregoso. He did not think it advisable to attempt this, or any other enterprise, till he had renewed amicable relations with the Florentines, and made his good understanding with them known; but with the aid of their reputation he trusted he should attain38 his wishes. He therefore sent ambassadors to Florence to signify his desires. Many citizens were opposed to his design, but did not wish to interrupt the peace with Milan, which had now continued for many years. They were fully39 aware of the advantages he would derive40 from a war with Genoa, and the little use it would be to Florence. Many others were inclined to accede41 to it, but would set a limit to his proceedings, which, if he were to exceed, all would perceive his base design, and thus they might, when the treaty was broken, more justifiably42 make war against him. The question having been strongly debated, an amicable arrangement was at length effected, by which Filippo engaged not to interfere43 with anything on the Florentine side of the rivers Magra and Panaro.
Soon after the treaty was concluded, the duke took possession of Brescia, and shortly afterward of Genoa, contrary to the expectation of those who had advocated peace; for they thought Brescia would be defended by the Venetians, and Genoa would be able to defend herself. And as in the treaty which Filippo made with the Doge of Genoa, he had acquired Serezana and other places situated44 on this side the Magra, upon condition that, if he wished to alienate45 them, they should be given to the Genoese, it was quite palpable that he had broken the treaty; and he had, besides, entered into another treaty with the legate of Bologna, in opposition46 to his engagement respecting the Panaro. These things disturbed the minds of the citizens, and made them, apprehensive47 of new troubles, consider the means to be adopted for their defense48.
The dissatisfaction of the Florentines coming to the knowledge of Filippo, he, either to justify49 himself, or to become acquainted with their prevailing50 feelings, or to lull51 them to repose52, sent ambassadors to the city, to intimate that he was greatly surprised at the suspicions they entertained, and offered to revoke53 whatever he had done that could be thought a ground of jealousy. This embassy produced no other effect than that of dividing the citizens; one party, that in greatest reputation, judged it best to arm, and prepare to frustrate54 the enemy’s designs; and if he were to remain quiet, it would not be necessary to go to war with him, but an endeavor might be made to preserve peace. Many others, whether envious55 of those in power, or fearing a rupture56 with the duke, considered it unadvisable so lightly to entertain suspicions of an ally, and thought his proceedings need not have excited so much distrust; that appointing the ten and hiring forces was in itself a manifest declaration of war, which, if undertaken against so great a prince, would bring certain ruin upon the city without the hope of any advantage; for possession could never be retained of the conquests that might be made, because Romagna lay between, and the vicinity of the church ought to prevent any attempt against Romagna itself. However the views of those who were in favor of war prevailed, the Council of Ten were appointed, forces were hired, and new taxes levied57, which, as they were more burdensome upon the lower than the upper ranks, filled the city with complaints, and all condemned58 the ambition and avarice59 of the great, declaring that, to gratify themselves and oppress the people, they would go to war without any justifiable60 motive61.
They had not yet come to an open rupture with the duke, but everything tended to excite suspicion; for Filippo had, at the request of the legate of Bologna (who was in fear of Antonio Bentivogli, an emigrant62 of Bologna at Castel Bolognese), sent forces to that city, which, being close upon the Florentine territory, filled the citizens with apprehension63; but what gave every one greater alarm, and offered sufficient occasion for the declaration of war, was the expedition made by the duke against Furli. Giorgio Ordelaffi was lord of Furli, who dying, left Tibaldo, his son, under the guardianship65 of Filippo. The boy’s mother, suspicious of his guardian64, sent him to Lodovico Alidossi, her father, who was lord of Imola, but she was compelled by the people of Furli to obey the will of her deceased husband, to withdraw him from the natural guardian, and place him in the hands of the duke. Upon this Filippo, the better to conceal66 his purpose, caused the Marquis of Ferrara to send Guido Torello as his agent, with forces, to seize the government of Furli, and thus the territory fell into the duke’s hands. When this was known at Florence, together with the arrival of forces at Bologna, the arguments in favor of war were greatly strengthened, but there were still many opposed to it, and among the rest Giovanni de’ Medici, who publicly endeavored to show, that even if the ill designs of the duke were perfectly5 manifest, it would still be better to wait and let him commence the attack, than to assail67 him; for in the former case they would be justified68 in the view of the princes of Italy as well as in their own; but if they were to strike the first blow at the duke, public opinion would be as favorable to him as to themselves; and besides, they could not so confidently demand assistance as assailants, as they might do if assailed69; and that men always defend themselves more vigorously when they attack others. The advocates of war considered it improper70 to await the enemy in their houses, and better to go and seek him; that fortune is always more favorable to assailants than to such as merely act on the defensive71, and that it is less injurious, even when attended with greater immediate72 expense, to make war at another’s door than at our own. These views prevailed, and it was resolved that the ten should provide all the means in their power for rescuing Furli from the hands of the duke.
Filippo, finding the Florentines resolved to occupy the places he had undertaken to defend, postponed73 all personal considerations, and sent Agnolo della Pergola with a strong force against Imola, that Ludovico, having to provide for the defense of his own possessions, might be unable to protect the interests of his grandson. Agnolo approached Imola while the forces of the Florentines were at Modigliana, and an intense frost having rendered the ditches of the city passable, he crossed them during the night, captured the place, and sent Lodovico a prisoner to Milan. The Florentines finding Imola in the hands of the enemy, and the war publicly known, sent their forces to Furli and besieged74 it on all sides. That the duke’s people might not relieve it, they hired Count Alberigo, who from Zagonara, his own domain75, overran the country daily, up to the gates of Imola. Agnolo della Pergola, finding the strong position which the Florentines had taken prevented him from relieving Furli, determined76 to attempt the capture of Zagonara, thinking they would not allow that place to be lost, and that in the endeavor to relieve it they would be compelled to give up their design against Furli, and come to an engagement under great disadvantage. Thus the duke’s people compelled Alberigo to sue for terms, which he obtained on condition of giving up Zagonara, if the Florentines did not relieve him within fifteen days. This misfortune being known in the Florentine camp and in the city, and all being anxious that the enemy should not obtain the expected advantage, they enabled him to secure a greater; for having abandoned the siege of Furli to go to the relief of Zagonara, on encountering the enemy they were soon routed, not so much by the bravery of their adversaries77 as by the severity of the season; for, having marched many hours through deep mud and heavy rain, they found the enemy quite fresh, and were therefore easily vanquished78. Nevertheless, in this great defeat, famous throughout all Italy, no death occurred except those of Lodovico degli Obizi and two of his people, who having fallen from their horses were drowned in the morass79.
1 license | |
n.执照,许可证,特许;v.许可,特许 | |
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2 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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3 amicable | |
adj.和平的,友好的;友善的 | |
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4 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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5 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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6 licentiousness | |
n.放肆,无法无天 | |
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7 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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8 ordinances | |
n.条例,法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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9 appeasing | |
安抚,抚慰( appease的现在分词 ); 绥靖(满足另一国的要求以避免战争) | |
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10 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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11 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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12 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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13 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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14 insolent | |
adj.傲慢的,无理的 | |
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15 tranquil | |
adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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16 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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17 factions | |
组织中的小派别,派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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18 afterward | |
adv.后来;以后 | |
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19 rabble | |
n.乌合之众,暴民;下等人 | |
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20 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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21 humiliated | |
感到羞愧的 | |
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22 annihilated | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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23 vengeance | |
n.报复,报仇,复仇 | |
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24 bosoms | |
胸部( bosom的名词复数 ); 胸怀; 女衣胸部(或胸襟); 和爱护自己的人在一起的情形 | |
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25 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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26 sinister | |
adj.不吉利的,凶恶的,左边的 | |
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27 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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28 negligent | |
adj.疏忽的;玩忽的;粗心大意的 | |
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29 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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30 humane | |
adj.人道的,富有同情心的 | |
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31 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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32 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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33 judicious | |
adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
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34 aggrandize | |
v.增大,扩张,吹捧 | |
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35 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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36 exalt | |
v.赞扬,歌颂,晋升,提升 | |
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37 humbled | |
adj. 卑下的,谦逊的,粗陋的 vt. 使 ... 卑下,贬低 | |
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38 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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39 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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40 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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41 accede | |
v.应允,同意 | |
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42 justifiably | |
adv.无可非议地 | |
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43 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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44 situated | |
adj.坐落在...的,处于某种境地的 | |
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45 alienate | |
vt.使疏远,离间;转让(财产等) | |
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46 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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47 apprehensive | |
adj.担心的,恐惧的,善于领会的 | |
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48 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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49 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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50 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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51 lull | |
v.使安静,使入睡,缓和,哄骗;n.暂停,间歇 | |
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52 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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53 revoke | |
v.废除,取消,撤回 | |
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54 frustrate | |
v.使失望;使沮丧;使厌烦 | |
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55 envious | |
adj.嫉妒的,羡慕的 | |
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56 rupture | |
n.破裂;(关系的)决裂;v.(使)破裂 | |
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57 levied | |
征(兵)( levy的过去式和过去分词 ); 索取; 发动(战争); 征税 | |
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58 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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59 avarice | |
n.贪婪;贪心 | |
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60 justifiable | |
adj.有理由的,无可非议的 | |
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61 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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62 emigrant | |
adj.移居的,移民的;n.移居外国的人,移民 | |
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63 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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64 guardian | |
n.监护人;守卫者,保护者 | |
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65 guardianship | |
n. 监护, 保护, 守护 | |
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66 conceal | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,隐蔽 | |
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67 assail | |
v.猛烈攻击,抨击,痛斥 | |
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68 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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69 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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70 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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71 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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72 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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73 postponed | |
vt.& vi.延期,缓办,(使)延迟vt.把…放在次要地位;[语]把…放在后面(或句尾)vi.(疟疾等)延缓发作(或复发) | |
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74 besieged | |
包围,围困,围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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75 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
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76 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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77 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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78 vanquished | |
v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 );战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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79 morass | |
n.沼泽,困境 | |
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