Civil Code, Art. 35.
2 Brev. Dig. 229. Prince’s Digest, 446.
What is it, according to the definition of law-books and of legal interpreters? “A slave,” says the law of Louisiana, “is one who is in the power of a master, to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry and his labor3; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything, but what must belong to his master.” South Carolina says “slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken, reputed and adjudged in law, to be chattels4 personal in the hands of their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators6, and assigns, TO ALL INTENTS, CONSTRUCTIONS AND PURPOSES WHATSOEVER7.” The law of Georgia is similar.
Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, 246. State v. Mann.
Let the reader reflect on the extent of the meaning in this last clause. Judge Ruffin, pronouncing the opinion of the Supreme8 Court of North Carolina, says, a slave is “one doomed9 in his own person, and his posterity10, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make anything his own, and to toil11 that another may reap the fruits.”
This is what slavery is,—this is what it is to be a slave! The slave-code, then, of the Southern States, is designed to keep millions of human beings in the condition of chattels personal; to keep them in a condition in which the master may sell them, dispose of their time, person and labor; in which they can do nothing, possess nothing, and acquire nothing, except for the benefit of the master; in which they are doomed in themselves and in their posterity to live without knowledge, without the power to make anything their own,—to toil that another may reap. The laws of the slave-code are designed to work out this problem, consistently with the peace of the community, and the safety of that superior race which is constantly to perpetrate this outrage12.
From this simple statement of what the laws of slavery are designed to do,—from a consideration that the class thus to be reduced, and oppressed, and made the subjects of a perpetual robbery, are men of like passions with our own, men originally made in the image of God as much as ourselves, men partakers of that same humanity of which Jesus Christ is the highest ideal and expression,—when we consider that the material thus to be acted upon is that fearfully explosive element, the soul of man; that soul elastic14, upspringing, immortal15, whose free will even the Omnipotence16 of God refuses to coerce,—we may form some idea of the tremendous force which is necessary to keep this mightiest17 of elements in the state of repression18 which is contemplated19 in the definition of slavery.
Of course, the system necessary to consummate20 and perpetuate21 such a work, from age to age, must be a fearfully stringent22 one; and our readers will find that it is so. Men who make the laws, and men who interpret them, may be fully13 sensible of their terrible severity and inhumanity; but, if they are going to preserve the THING, they have no resource but to make the laws, and to execute them faithfully after they are made. They may say, with the honorable Judge Ruffin, of North Carolina, when solemnly from the bench announcing this great foundation principle of slavery, that “THE POWER OF THE MASTER MUST BE ABSOLUTE, 71TO RENDER THE SUBMISSION24 OF THE SLAVE PERFECT,”—they may say, with him, “I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition; I feel it as deeply as any man can; and, as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement25 must repudiate26 it;”—but they will also be obliged to add, with him, “But, in the actual condition of things, it MUST BE SO. * * This discipline belongs to the state of slavery. * * * It is INHERENT in the relation of master and slave.”
And, like Judge Ruffin, men of honor, men of humanity, men of kindest and gentlest feelings, are obliged to interpret these severe laws with inflexible27 severity. In the perpetual reaction of that awful force of human passion and human will, which necessarily meets the compressive power of slavery,—in that seething28, boiling tide, never wholly repressed, which rolls its volcanic29 stream underneath30 the whole frame-work of society so constituted, ready to find vent31 at the least rent or fissure32 or unguarded aperture,—there is a constant necessity which urges to severity of law and inflexibility33 of execution. So Judge Ruffin says, “We cannot allow the right of the matter to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is NO APPEAL FROM HIS MASTER.” Accordingly, we find in the more southern states, where the slave population is most accumulated, and slave property most necessary and valuable, and, of course, the determination to abide34 by the system the most decided35, there the enactments37 are most severe, and the interpretation38 of courts the most inflexible.[4] And, when legal decisions of a contrary character begin to be made, it would appear that it is a symptom of leaning towards emancipation39. So abhorrent40 is the slave-code to every feeling of humanity, that just as soon as there is any hesitancy in the community about perpetuating41 the institution of slavery, judges begin to listen to the voice of their more honorable nature, and by favorable interpretations42 to soften43 its necessary severities.
Such decisions do not commend themselves to the professional admiration44 of legal gentlemen. But in the workings of the slave system, when the irresponsible power which it guarantees comes to be used by men of the most brutal45 nature, cases sometimes arise for trial where the consistent exposition of the law involves results so loathsome46 and frightful47, that the judge prefers to be illogical, rather than inhuman23. Like a spring outgushing in the desert, some noble man, now and then, from the fulness of his own better nature, throws out a legal decision, generously inconsistent with every principle and precedent48 of slave jurisprudence, and we bless God for it. All we wish is that there were more of them, for then should we hope that the day of redemption was drawing nigh.
The reader is now prepared to enter with us on the proof of this proposition: That the slave-code is designed only for the security of the master, and not with regard to the welfare of the slave.
This is implied in the whole current of law-making and law-administration, and is often asserted in distinct form, with a precision and clearness of legal accuracy which, in a literary point of view, are quite admirable. Thus, Judge Ruffin, after stating that considerations restricting the power of the master had often been drawn49 from a comparison of slavery with the relation of parent and child, master and apprentice50, tutor and pupil, says distinctly:
The court does not recognize their application. There is no likeness51 between the cases. They are in opposition52 to each other, and there is an impassable gulf53 between them. * * * *
Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, page 246.
In the one [case], the end in view is the happiness of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor, on whom the duty devolves of training the young to usefulness, in a station which he is afterwards to assume among freemen. * * * * With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety.
Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 239.
Not only is this principle distinctly asserted in so many words, but it is more distinctly implied in multitudes of the arguings and reasonings which are given as grounds of legal decisions. Even such provisions as seem to be for the benefit of the slave we often find carefully interpreted so as to show that it is only on account of his property value to his master that he is thus protected, and not from any consideration of humanity towards himself. Thus it has been decided that a master can bring no action for assault and battery on his slave, unless the injury be such as to produce a loss of service.
The spirit in which this question is discussed is worthy54 of remark. We give a 72brief statement of the case, as presented in Wheeler, p. 239.
Cornfute v. Dale, April Term, 1800. 1 Har. & Johns. Rep. 4
2 Lutw. 1481; 20 Viner’s Abr. 454.
It was an action for assault and battery committed by Dale on one Cornfute’s slave. It was contended by Cornfute’s counsel that it was not necessary to prove loss of service, in order that the action should be sustained; that an action might be supported for beating plaintiff’s horse; and that the lord might have an action for the battery of his villein, which is founded on this principle, that, as the villein could not support the action, the injury would be without redress55, unless the lord could. On the other side it was said that Lord Chief Justice Raymond had decided that an assault on a horse was no cause of action, unless accompanied with a special damage of the animal, which would impair56 his value.
Chief Justice Chase decided that no redress could be obtained in the case, because the value of the slave had not been impaired57, and without injury or wrong to the master no action could be sustained; and assigned this among other reasons for it, that there was no reciprocity in the case, as the master was not liable for assault and battery committed by his slave, neither could he gain redress for one committed upon his slave.
Let any reader now imagine what an amount of wanton cruelty and indignity58 may be heaped upon a slave man or woman or child without actually impairing59 their power to do service to the master, and he will have a full sense of the cruelty of this decision.
Tate v. O’Neal, 1 Hawks60, 418. U. S. Dig. Sup. 2, p. 797, § 121.
In the same spirit it has been held in North Carolina that patrols (night watchmen) are not liable to the master for inflicting63 punishment on the slave, unless their conduct clearly demonstrates malice64 against the master.
State v. Maner, 2 Hill’s Rep. 453. Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, page 243.
The cool-bloodedness of some of these legal discussions is forcibly shown by two decisions in Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 243. On the question whether the criminal offence of assault and battery can be committed on a slave, there are two decisions of the two States of South and North Carolina; and it is difficult to say which of these decisions has the pre?minence for cool legal inhumanity. That of South Carolina reads thus.
Judge O’Neill says:
The criminal offence of assault and battery can not, at common law, be committed upon the person of a slave. For notwithstanding (for some purposes) a slave is regarded by law as a person, yet generally he is a mere65 chattel5 personal, and his right of personal protection belongs to his master, who can maintain an action of trespass66 for the battery of his slave. There can be therefore no offence against the state for a mere beating of a slave unaccompanied with any circumstances of cruelty (!!), or an attempt to kill and murder. The peace of the state is not thereby67 broken; for a slave is not generally regarded as legally capable of being within the peace of the state. He is not a citizen, and is not in that character entitled to her protection.
See State v. Hale. Wheeler, p. 239. 2 Hawk61. N. C. Rep. 582.
What declaration of the utter indifference68 of the state to the sufferings of the slave could be more elegantly cool and clear? But in North Carolina it appears that the case is argued still more elaborately.
Chief Justice Taylor thus shows that, after all, there are reasons why an assault and battery upon the slave may, on the whole, have some such general connection with the comfort and security of the community, that it may be construed69 into a breach70 of the peace, and should be treated as an indictable offence.
1 Rev2. Code 448.
The instinct of a slave may be, and generally is, tamed into subservience71 to his master’s will, and from him he receives chastisement72, whether it be merited or not, with perfect submission; for he knows the extent of the dominion74 assumed over him, and that the law ratifies75 the claim. But when the same authority is wantonly usurped76 by a stranger, nature is disposed to assert her rights, and to prompt the slave to a resistance, often momentarily successful, sometimes fatally so. The public peace is thus broken, as much as if a free man had been beaten; for the party of the aggressor is always the strongest, and such contests usually terminate by overpowering the slave, and inflicting on him a severe chastisement, without regard to the original cause of the conflict. There is, consequently, as much reason for making such offences indictable as if a white man had been the victim. A wanton injury committed on a slave is a great provocation77 to the owner, awakens78 his resentment79, and has a direct tendency to a breach of the peace, by inciting80 him to seek immediate81 vengeance82. If resented in the heat of blood, it would probably extenuate83 a homicide to manslaughter, upon the same principle with the case stated by Lord Hale, that if A riding on the road, B had whipped his horse out of the track, and then A had alighted and killed B. These offences are usually committed by men of dissolute habits, hanging loose upon society, who, being repelled84 from association with well-disposed citizens, take refuge in the company of colored persons and slaves, whom they deprave by their example, embolden85 by their familiarity, and then beat, under the expectation that a slave dare not resent a blow from a white man. If such offences may be committed with impunity86, the public peace will not only be rendered extremely insecure, but the value of slave property must be much impaired, for the offenders88 can seldom make any reparation in damages. Nor is it necessary, in any case, that a person who has received an injury, real or imaginary, from a slave, should carve out his own justice; 73for the law has made ample and summary provision for the punishment of all trivial offences committed by slaves, by carrying them before a justice, who is authorized89 to pass sentence for their being publicly whipped. This provision, while it excludes the necessity of private vengeance, would seem to forbid its legality, since it effectually protects all persons from the insolence91 of slaves, even where their masters are unwilling92 to correct them upon complaint being made. The common law has often been called into efficient operation, for the punishment of public cruelty inflicted93 upon animals, for needless and wanton barbarity exercised even by masters upon their slaves, and for various violations94 of decency96, morals, and comfort. Reason and analogy seem to require that a human being, although the subject of property, should be so far protected as the public might be injured through him.
For all purposes necessary to enforce the obedience97 of the slave, and to render him useful as property, the law secures to the master a complete authority over him, and it will not lightly interfere98 with the relation thus established. It is a more effectual guarantee of his right of property, when the slave is protected from wanton abuse from those who have no power over him; for it cannot be disputed that a slave is rendered less capable of performing his master’s service when he finds himself exposed by the law to the capricious violence of every turbulent man in the community.
If this is not a scrupulous99 disclaimer of all humane100 intention in the decision, as far as the slave is concerned, and an explicit101 declaration that he is protected only out of regard to the comfort of the community, and his property value to his master, it is difficult to see how such a declaration could be made. After all this cool-blooded course of remark, it is somewhat curious to come upon the following certainly most unexpected declaration, which occurs in the very next paragraph:
Mitigated102 as slavery is by the humanity of our laws, the refinement103 of manners, and by public opinion, which revolts at every instance of cruelty towards them, it would be an anomaly in the system of police which affects them, if the offence stated in the verdict were not indictable.
The reader will please to notice that this remarkable104 declaration is made of the State of North Carolina. We shall have occasion again to refer to it by and by, when we extract from the statute105-book of North Carolina some specimens106 of these humane laws.
Jourdain v. Patton, July term, 1818. 5 Martin’s Louis Rep. 615.
In the same spirit it is decided, under the law of Louisiana, that if an individual injures another’s slave so as to make him entirely108 useless, and the owner recovers from him the full value of the slave, the slave by that act becomes thenceforth the property of the person who injured him. A decision to this effect is given in Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 249. A woman sued for an injury done to her slave by the slave of the defendant110. The injury was such as to render him entirely useless, his only eye being put out. The parish court decreed that she should recover twelve hundred dollars, that the defendant should pay a further sum of twenty-five dollars a month from the time of the injury; also the physician’s bill, and two hundred dollars for the sustenance111 of the slave during his life, and that he should remain forever in the possession of his mistress.
The case was appealed. The judge reversed the decision, and delivered the slave into the possession of the man whose slave had committed the outrage. In the course of the decision, the judge remarks, with that calm legal explicitness112 for which many decisions of this kind are remarkable, that
The principle of humanity, which would lead us to suppose that the mistress, whom he had long served, would treat her miserable113 blind slave with more kindness than the defendant, to whom the judgment114 ought to transfer him, cannot be taken into consideration in deciding this case.
Jan. term, 1828. 9 Martin La. Rep. 350.
Another case, reported in Wheeler’s Law, page 198, the author thus summarily abridges115. It is Dorothee v. Coquillon et al. A young girl, by will of her mistress, was to have her freedom at twenty-one; and it was required by the will that in the mean time she should be educated in such a manner as to enable her to earn her living when free, her services in the mean time being bequeathed to the daughter of the defendant. Her mother (a free woman) entered complaint that no care was taken of the child’s education, and that she was cruelly treated. The prayer of the petition was that the child be declared free at twenty-one, and in the mean time hired out by the sheriff. The suit was decided against the mother, on this ground,—that she could not sue for her daughter in a case where the daughter could not sue for herself were she of age,—the object of the suit being relief from ill-treatment during the time of her slavery, which a slave cannot sue for.
Jan. term, 1827. 4 M’Cord’s Rep. 161. Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 201.
Observe, now, the following case of Jennings v. Fundeberg. It seems Jennings brings an action of trespass against Fundeberg for killing116 his slave. The case was thus: Fundeberg with others, being out hunting runaway117 negroes, surprised them in their camp, and, as the report says, “fired his gun towards them as they were running 74away, to induce them to stop.” One of them, being shot through the head, was thus induced to stop,—and the master of the boy brought action for trespass against the firer for killing his slave.
The decision of the inferior court was as follows:
The court “thought the killing accidental, and that the defendant ought not to be made answerable as a trespasser118.” * * * *
“When one is lawfully120 interfering121 with the property of another, and accidentally destroys it, he is no trespasser, and ought not to be answerable for the value of the property. In this case, the defendant was engaged in a lawful119 and meritorious122 service, and if he really fired his gun in the manner stated it was an allowable act.”
The superior judge reversed the decision, on the ground that in dealing123 with another person’s property one is responsible for any injury which he could have avoided by any degree of circumspection124. “The firing ... was rash and incautious.”
Does not the whole spirit of this discussion speak for itself?
Jan. T. 1827. 4 M’Cord’s Rep. 156.
See also the very next case in Wheeler’s Law. Richardson v. Dukes, p. 202.
Trespass for killing the plaintiff’s slave. It appeared the slave was stealing potatoes from a bank near the defendant’s house. The defendant fired upon him with a gun loaded with buckshot, and killed him. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for one dollar. Motion for a new trial.
The Court. Nott J. held, there must be a new trial; that the jury ought to have given the plaintiff the value of the slave. That if the jury were of opinion the slave was of bad character, some deduction125 from the usual price ought to be made, but the plaintiff was certainly entitled to his actual damage for killing his slave. Where property is in question, the value of the article, as nearly as it can be ascertained126, furnishes a rule from which they are not at liberty to depart.
Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, 220.
It seems that the value of this unfortunate piece of property was somewhat reduced from the circumstance of his “stealing potatoes.” Doubtless he had his own best reasons for this; so, at least, we should infer from the following remark, which occurs in one of the reasonings of Judge Taylor, of N. Carolina.
“The act of 1786 (Iredell’s Revisal, p. 588) does, in the preamble127, recognize the fact, that many persons, by cruel treatment to their slaves, cause them to commit crimes for which they are executed. * * The cruel treatment here alluded128 to must consist in withholding129 from them the necessaries of life; and the crimes thus resulting are such as are calculated to furnish them with food and raiment.”
Perhaps “stealing potatoes” in this case was one of the class of crimes alluded to.
Witsell v. Earnest & Parker. Wheeler, p. 202.
Again we have the following case:
The defendants130 went to the plantation131 of Mrs. Witsell for the purpose of hunting for runaway negroes; there being many in the neighborhood, and the place in considerable alarm. As they approached the house with loaded guns, a negro ran from the house, or near the house, towards a swamp, when they fired and killed him.
The judge charged the jury, that such circumstances might exist, by the excitement and alarm of the neighborhood, as to authorize90 the killing of a negro without the sanction of a magistrate132.
This decision was reversed in the Superior Court, in the following language:
By the statute of 1740, any white man may apprehend133 and moderately correct any slave who may be found out of the plantation at which he is employed, and if the slave assaults the white person, he may be killed; but a slave who is merely flying away cannot be killed. Nor can the defendants be justified134 by common law, IF we consider the negro as a person; for they were not clothed with the authority of the law to apprehend him as a felon135, and without such authority he could not be killed.
Wheeler, p. 252. June T., 1820. Walker’s Rep. 83.
If we consider the negro a person, says the judge; and, from his decision in the case, he evidently intimates that he has a strong leaning to this opinion, though it has been contested by so many eminent136 legal authorities that he puts forth109 his sentiment modestly, and in an hypothetical form. The reader, perhaps, will need to be informed that the question whether the slave is to be considered a person or a human being in any respect has been extensively and ably argued on both sides in legal courts, and it may be a comfort to know that the balance of legal opinion inclines in favor of the slave. Judge Clarke, of Mississippi, is quite clear on the point, and argues very ably and earnestly, though, as he confesses, against very respectable legal authorities, that the slave is a person,—that he is a reasonable creature. The reasoning occurs in the case State of Mississippi v. Jones, and is worthy of attention as a literary curiosity.
It seems that a case of murder of a slave had been clearly made out and proved in the lower court, and that judgment was arrested and the case appealed on the ground whether, in that state, murder could be committed on a slave. Judge Clarke thus ably and earnestly argues:
The question in this case is, whether murder can be committed on a slave. Because individuals 75may have been deprived of many of their rights by society, it does not follow, that they have been deprived of all their rights. In some respects, slaves may be considered as chattels; but in others, they are regarded as men. The law views them as capable of committing crimes. This can only be upon the principle, that they are men and rational beings. The Roman law has been much relied on by the counsel of the defendant. That law was confined to the Roman empire, giving the power of life and death over captives in war, as slaves; but it no more extended here, than the similar power given to parents over the lives of their children. Much stress has also been laid by the defendant’s counsel on the case cited from Taylor’s Reports, decided in North Carolina; yet, in that case, two judges against one were of opinion, that killing a slave was murder. Judge Hall, who delivered the dissenting137 opinion in the above case based his conclusions, as we conceive, upon erroneous principles, by considering the laws of Rome applicable here. His inference, also, that a person cannot be condemned138 capitally, because he may be liable in a civil action, is not sustained by reason or authority, but appears to us to be in direct opposition to both. At a very early period in Virginia, the power of life over slaves was given by statute; but Tucker observes, that as soon as these statutes139 were repealed140, it was at once considered by their courts that the killing of a slave might be murder. Commonwealth141 v. Dolly Chapman: indictment142 for maliciously143 stabbing a slave, under a statute. It has been determined144 in Virginia that slaves are persons. In the constitution of the United States, slaves are expressly designated as “persons.” In this state the legislature have considered slaves as reasonable and accountable beings; and it would be a stigma145 upon the character of the state, and a reproach to the administration of justice, if the life of a slave could be taken with impunity, or if he could be murdered in cold blood, without subjecting the offender87 to the highest penalty known to the criminal jurisprudence of the country. Has the slave no rights, because he is deprived of his freedom? He is still a human being, and possesses all those rights of which he is not deprived by the positive provisions of the law; but in vain shall we look for any law passed by the enlightened and philanthropic legislature of this state, giving even to the master, much less to a stranger, power over the life of a slave. Such a statute would be worthy the age of Draco or Caligula, and would be condemned by the unanimous voice of the people of this state, where even cruelty to slaves, much [more] the taking away of life, meets with universal reprobation147. By the provisions of our law, a slave may commit murder, and be punished with death; why, then, is it not murder to kill a slave? Can a mere chattel commit murder, and be subject to punishment?
The right of the master exists not by force of the law of nature or nations, but by virtue148 only of the positive law of the state; and although that gives to the master the right to command the services of the slave, requiring the master to feed and clothe the slave from infancy149 till death, yet it gives the master no right to take the life of the slave; and, if the offence be not murder, it is not a crime, and subjects the offender to no punishment.
The taking away the life of a reasonable creature, under the king’s peace, with malice aforethought, express or implied, is murder at common law. Is not a slave a reasonable creature?—is he not a human being? And the meaning of this phrase, reasonable creature, is, a human being. For the killing a lunatic, an idiot, or even a child unborn, is murder, as much as the killing a philosopher; and has not the slave as much reason as a lunatic, an idiot, or an unborn child?
Thus triumphantly150, in this nineteenth century of the Christian151 era and in the State of Mississippi, has it been made to appear that the slave is a reasonable creature,—a human being!
What sort of system, what sort of a public sentiment, was that which made this argument necessary?
And let us look at some of the admissions of this argument with regard to the nature of slavery. According to the judge, it is depriving human beings of many of their rights. Thus he says: “Because individuals may have been deprived of many of their rights by society, it does not follow that they have been deprived of all their rights.” Again, he says of the slave: “He is still a human being, and possesses all those rights of which he is not deprived by the positive provisions of the law.” Here he admits that the provisions of law deprive the slave of natural rights. Again he says: “The right of the master exists not by force of the law of nature or of nations, but by virtue only of the positive law of the state.” According to the decision of this judge, therefore, slavery exists by the same right that robbery or oppression of any kind does,—the right of ability. A gang of robbers associated into a society have rights over all the neighboring property that they can acquire, of precisely152 the same kind.
With the same unconscious serenity153 does the law apply that principle of force and robbery which is the essence of slavery, and show how far the master may proceed in appropriating another human being as his property.
Wheeler, p. 28. Banks, Adm’r, v. Marksbury. Spring T. 1823. 3 Little’s Rep. 275.
The question arises, May a master give a woman to one person, and her unborn children to another one? Let us hear the case argued. The unfortunate mother selected as the test point of this interesting legal principle comes to our view in the will of one Samuel Marksbury, under the style and denomination154 of “my negro wench Pen.” Said Samuel states in his will that, for the good will and love he bears to his own children, he gives said negro wench Pen to son Samuel, and all her future increase to 76daughter Rachael. When daughter Rachael, therefore, marries, her husband sets up a claim for this increase,—as it is stated, quite off-hand, that the “wench had several children.” Here comes a beautifully interesting case, quite stimulating155 to legal acumen156. Inferior court decides that Samuel Marksbury could not have given away unborn children on the strength of the legal maxim157, “Nemo dat quod non habet,”—i. e., “Nobody can give what he has not got,”—which certainly one should think sensible and satisfactory enough. The case, however, is appealed, and reversed in the superior court; and now let us hear the reasoning.
The judge acknowledges the force of the maxim above quoted,—says, as one would think any man might say, that it is quite a correct maxim,—the only difficulty being that it does not at all apply to the present case. Let us hear him:
He who is the absolute owner of a thing owns all its faculties158 for profit or increase; and he may, no doubt, grant the profits or increase, as well as the thing itself. Thus, it is every day’s practice to grant the future rents or profits of real estate; and it is held that a man may grant the wool of a flock of sheep for years.
See also p. 33, Fanny v. Bryant, 4 J. J. Marshall’s Rep., 368. In this almost precisely the same language is used. If the reader will proceed, he will find also this principle applied159 with equal clearness to the hiring, selling, mortgaging of unborn children; and the perfect legal nonchalance160 of these discussions is only comparable to running a dissecting-knife through the course of all the heart-strings of a living subject, for the purpose of demonstrating the laws of nervous contraction161.
Judge Stroud, in his sketch162 of the slave-laws, page 99, lays down for proof the following assertion: That the penal146 codes of the slave states bear much more severely163 on slaves than on white persons. He introduces his consideration of this proposition by the following humane and sensible remarks:
A being, ignorant of letters, unenlightened by religion, and deriving164 but little instruction from good example, cannot be supposed to have right conceptions as to the nature and extent of moral or political obligations. This remark, with but a slight qualification, is applicable to the condition of the slave. It has been just shown that the benefits of education are not conferred upon him, while his chance of acquiring a knowledge of the precepts165 of the gospel is so remote as scarcely to be appreciated. He may be regarded, therefore as almost without the capacity to comprehend the force of laws; and, on this account, such as are designed for his government should be recommended by their simplicity166 and mildness.
His condition suggests another motive168 for tenderness on his behalf in these particulars. He is unable to read, and holding little or no communication with those who are better informed than himself; how is he to become acquainted with the fact that a law for his observance has been made? To exact obedience to a law which has not been promulgated,—which is unknown to the subject of it,—has ever been deemed most unjust and tyrannical. The reign169 of Caligula, were it obnoxious170 to no other reproach than this, would never cease to be remembered with abhorrence171.
The lawgivers of the slaveholding states seem, in the formation of their penal codes, to have been uninfluenced by these claims of the slave upon their compassionate172 consideration. The hardened convict moves their sympathy, and is to be taught the laws before he is expected to obey them; yet the guiltless slave is subjected to an extensive system of cruel enactments, of no part of which, probably, has he ever heard.
Parts of this system apply to the slave exclusively, and for every infraction173 a large retribution is demanded; while, with respect to offences for which whites as well as slaves are amenable174, punishments of much greater severity are inflicted upon the latter than upon the former.
This heavy charge of Judge Stroud is sustained by twenty pages of proof, showing the very great disproportion between the number of offences made capital for slaves, and those that are so for whites. Concerning this, we find the following cool remark in Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, page 222, note.
Much has been said of the disparity of punishment between the white inhabitants and the slaves and negroes of the same state; that slaves are punished with much more severity, for the commission of similar crimes, by white persons, than the latter. The charge is undoubtedly175 true to a considerable extent. It must be remembered that the primary object of the enactment36 of penal laws, is the protection and security of those who make them. The slave has no agency in making them. He is indeed one cause of the apprehended176 evils to the other class, which those laws are expected to remedy. That he should be held amenable for a violation95 of those rules established for the security of the other, is the natural result of the state in which he is placed. And the severity of those rules will always bear a relation to that danger, real or ideal, of the other class.
It has been so among all nations, and will ever continue to be so, while the disparity between bond and free remains177.
The State v. Mann. Dec. Term, 1829. 2 Devereaux’s North Carolina Rep. 265.
A striking example of a legal decision to this purport178 is given in Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, page 224. The case, apart from legal technicalities, may be thus briefly179 stated:
77The defendant, Mann, had hired a slave-woman for a year. During this time the slave committed some slight offence, for which the defendant undertook to chastise73 her. While in the act of doing so the slave ran off, whereat he shot at and wounded her. The judge in the inferior court charged the jury that if they believed the punishment was cruel and unwarrantable, and disproportioned to the offence, in law the defendant was guilty, as he had only a special property in the slave. The jury finding evidence that the punishment had been cruel, unwarrantable and disproportioned to the offence, found verdict against the defendant. But on what ground?—Because, according to the law of North Carolina, cruel, unwarrantable, disproportionate punishment of a slave from a master, is an indictable offence? No. They decided against the defendant, not because the punishment was cruel and unwarrantable, but because he was not the person who had the right to inflict62 it, “as he had only a SPECIAL right of property in the slave.”
The defendant appealed to a higher court, and the decision was reversed, on the ground that the hirer has for the time being all the rights of the master. The remarks of Judge Ruffin are so characteristic, and so strongly express the conflict between the feelings of the humane judge and the logical necessity of a strict interpreter of slave-law, that we shall quote largely from it. One cannot but admire the unflinching calmness with which a man, evidently possessed180 of honorable and humane feelings, walks through the most extreme and terrible results and conclusions, in obedience to the laws of legal truth. Thus he says:
A judge cannot but lament181, when such cases as the present are brought into judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated, but where institutions similar to our own exist, and are thoroughly182 understood. The struggle, too, in the judge’s own breast, between the feelings of the man and the duty of the magistrate, is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless, however, to complain of things inherent in our political state. And it is criminal in a court to avoid any responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance183, therefore, it is done, the court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave in North Carolina. The indictment charges a battery on Lydia, a slave of Elizabeth Jones.... The inquiry184 here is, whether a cruel and unreasonable185 battery on a slave by the hirer is indictable. The judge below instructed the jury that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground, that the defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly treat the master, or other person having the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to the same extent of authority. The object is the same, the service of the slave; and the same powers must be confided186. In a criminal proceeding187, and, indeed, in reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of the slave, in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner.... But, upon the general question, whether the owner is answerable criminaliter, for a battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority of force, not forbidden by statute, the court entertains but little doubt. That he is so liable, has never been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contended. There has been no prosecution188 of the sort. The established habits and uniform practice of the country, in this respect, is the best evidence of the portion of power deemed by the whole community requisite189 to the preservation190 of the master’s dominion. If we thought differently, we could not set our notions in array against the judgment of everybody else, and say that this or that authority may be safely lopped off. This has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles, which confer and restrain the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the apprentice, have been pressed on us.
The court does not recognize their application. There is no likeness between the cases. They are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf between them. The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery; and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness of the youth born to equal rights with that governor on whom the duty devolves of training the young to usefulness, in a station which he is afterwards to assume among freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and intellectual instruction seem the natural means; and, for the most part, they are found to suffice. Moderate force is superadded only to make the others effectual. If that fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a private person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed, in his own person and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What moral considerations shall be addressed to such a being, to convince him what it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true,—that he is thus to labor upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness? Such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit167 obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition. I feel it as deeply as any man can. And, as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. But, in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited without abrogating191 at once the rights of the master, and absolving192 the slave from his subjection. It constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our population. But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave. That there may be particular instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity, where in conscience the law might properly interfere, is most probable. The difficulty is to determine where a court may properly begin. Merely in the abstract, it may well be asked which power of the master accords with right. The answer will probably sweep away all of them. But we cannot look at the matter in that light. The truth is that we are forbidden to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the subject. We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is no appeal from his master; that his power is, in no instance, usurped, but is conferred by the laws of man, at least, if not by the law of God. The danger would be great, indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be called on to graduate the punishment appropriate to every temper and every dereliction of menial duty.
No man can anticipate the many and aggravated193 provocations194 of the master which the slave would be constantly stimulated195 by his own passions, or the instigation of others, to give; or the consequent wrath196 of the master, prompting him to bloody197 vengeance upon the turbulent traitor198; a vengeance generally practised with impunity, by reason of its privacy. The court, therefore, disclaims199 the power of changing the relation in which these parts of our people stand to each other.
I repeat, that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful question. But, being brought to it, the court is compelled to declare that while slavery exists amongst us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative200 duty of the judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise of it is forbidden by statute.
And this we do upon the ground that this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the master and the public tranquility, greatly dependent upon their subordination; and, in fine, as most effectually securing the general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves. Judgment below reversed; and judgment entered for the defendant.
No one can read this decision, so fine and clear in expression, so dignified201 and solemn in its earnestness, and so dreadful in its results, without feeling at once deep respect for the man and horror for the system. The man, judging him from this short specimen107, which is all the author knows,[5] has one of that high order of minds, which looks straight through all verbiage202 and sophistry203 to the heart of every subject which it encounters. He has, too, that noble scorn of dissimulation204, that straight-forward determination not to call a bad thing by a good name, even when most popular and reputable and legal, which it is to be wished could be more frequently seen, both in our Northern and Southern States. There is but one sole regret; and that is that such a man, with such a mind, should have been merely an expositor, and not a reformer of law.
4. We except the State of Louisiana. Owing to the influence of the French code in that state, more really humane provisions prevail there. How much these provisions avail in point of fact, will be shown when we come to that part of the subject.
5. More recently the author has met with a passage in a North Carolina newspaper, containing some further particulars of the life of Judge Ruffin, which have proved interesting to her, and may also to the reader.
From the Raleigh (N. C.) Register.
Resignation of the Chief Justice of the State of North Carolina.
We publish below the letter of Chief Justice Ruffin, of the Supreme Court, resigning his seat on the bench.
This act takes us, and no less will it take the state, by surprise. The public are not prepared for it; and we doubt not there will scarcely be an exception to the deep and general regret which will be felt throughout the state. Judge Ruffin’s great and unsurpassed legal learning, his untiring industry, the ease with which he mastered the details and comprehended the whole of the most complicated cases, were the admiration of the bar; and it has been a common saying of the ablest lawyers of the state, for a long time past, that his place on the bench could be supplied by no other than himself.
He is now, as we learn, in the sixty-fifth year of his age, in full possession of his usual excellent health, unaffected, so far as we can discover, in his natural vigor205 and strength, and certainly without any symptom of mental decay. Forty-five years ago he commenced the practice of the law. He has been on the bench twenty-eight years, of which time he has been one of the Supreme Court twenty-three years. During this long public career he has, in a pecuniary206 point of view, sacrificed many thousands; for there has been no time of it in which he might not, with perfect ease, have doubled, by practice, the amount of his salary as judge.
“To the Honorable the General Assembly of North Carolina, now in session.
“Gentlemen: I desire to retire to the walks of private life, and therefore pray your honorable body to accept the resignation of my place on the bench of the Supreme Court. In surrendering this trust, I would wish to express my grateful sense of the confidence and honors so often and so long bestowed207 on me by the General Assembly. But I have no language to do it suitably. I am very sensible that they were far beyond my deserts, and that I have made an insufficient208 return of the service. Yet I can truly aver1 that, to the best of my ability, I have administered the law as I understood it, and to the ends of suppressing crime and wrong, and upholding virtue, truth and right; aiming to give confidence to honest men, and to confirm in all good citizens love for our country, and a pure trust in her law and magistrates209.
“In my place I hope I have contributed to these ends; and I firmly believe that our laws will, as heretofore, be executed, and our people happy in the administration of justice, honest and contented210, as long as they keep, and only so long as they keep, the independent and sound judiciary now established in the constitution; which, with all other blessings211, I earnestly pray may be perpetuated212 to the people of North Carolina.
“I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obliged and obedient servant,
Thomas Ruffin.
“Raleigh, November 10, 1852.”
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1
aver
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| v.极力声明；断言；确证 | |
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rev
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| v.发动机旋转，加快速度 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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chattels
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| n.动产，奴隶( chattel的名词复数 ) | |
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chattel
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| n.动产；奴隶 | |
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administrators
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| n.管理者( administrator的名词复数 )；有管理（或行政）才能的人；（由遗嘱检验法庭指定的）遗产管理人；奉派暂管主教教区的牧师 | |
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whatsoever
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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doomed
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posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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outrage
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| n.暴行，侮辱，愤怒；vt.凌辱，激怒 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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omnipotence
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| n.全能，万能，无限威力 | |
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mightiest
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| adj.趾高气扬( mighty的最高级 )；巨大的；强有力的；浩瀚的 | |
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repression
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| n.镇压，抑制，抑压 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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consummate
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| adj.完美的；v.成婚；使完美 [反]baffle | |
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perpetuate
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stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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inhuman
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submission
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retirement
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repudiate
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inflexible
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| adj.不可改变的，不受影响的，不屈服的 | |
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seething
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| 沸腾的，火热的 | |
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volcanic
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| adj.火山的；象火山的；由火山引起的 | |
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underneath
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vent
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fissure
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inflexibility
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abide
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decided
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enactment
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enactments
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interpretation
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emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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abhorrent
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| adj.可恶的，可恨的，讨厌的 | |
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perpetuating
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| perpetuate的现在进行式 | |
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interpretations
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soften
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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loathsome
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| adj.讨厌的，令人厌恶的 | |
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frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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drawn
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apprentice
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likeness
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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impair
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| v.损害，损伤；削弱，减少 | |
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impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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indignity
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| n.侮辱，伤害尊严，轻蔑 | |
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impairing
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| v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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hawks
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| 鹰( hawk的名词复数 )； 鹰派人物，主战派人物 | |
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hawk
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| n.鹰，骗子；鹰派成员 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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mere
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trespass
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thereby
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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subservience
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| n.有利，有益；从属（地位），附属性；屈从，恭顺；媚态 | |
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chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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chastise
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| vt.责骂，严惩 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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ratifies
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的第三人称单数 ) | |
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usurped
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| 篡夺，霸占( usurp的过去式和过去分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权 | |
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provocation
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awakens
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的第三人称单数 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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inciting
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| 刺激的，煽动的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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extenuate
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| v.减轻，使人原谅 | |
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repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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85
embolden
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| v.给…壮胆，鼓励 | |
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86
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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87
offender
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| n.冒犯者，违反者，犯罪者 | |
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88
offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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89
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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90
authorize
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| v.授权，委任；批准，认可 | |
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91
insolence
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| n.傲慢；无礼；厚颜；傲慢的态度 | |
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92
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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93
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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violations
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| 违反( violation的名词复数 )； 冒犯； 违反（行为、事例）； 强奸 | |
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95
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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96
decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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97
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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98
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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99
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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100
humane
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| adj.人道的，富有同情心的 | |
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101
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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102
mitigated
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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103
refinement
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| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
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104
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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105
statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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106
specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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107
specimen
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| n.样本，标本 | |
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108
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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109
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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110
defendant
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| n.被告；adj.处于被告地位的 | |
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111
sustenance
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| n.食物，粮食；生活资料；生计 | |
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112
explicitness
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113
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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114
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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115
abridges
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| 节略( abridge的第三人称单数 )； 减少； 缩短； 剥夺（某人的）权利（或特权等） | |
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116
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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117
runaway
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| n.逃走的人，逃亡，亡命者；adj.逃亡的，逃走的 | |
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118
trespasser
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| n.侵犯者；违反者 | |
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119
lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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120
lawfully
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| adv.守法地，合法地；合理地 | |
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121
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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122
meritorious
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| adj.值得赞赏的 | |
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123
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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124
circumspection
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| n.细心，慎重 | |
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125
deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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126
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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127
preamble
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| n.前言；序文 | |
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128
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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129
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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130
defendants
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| 被告( defendant的名词复数 ) | |
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131
plantation
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| n.种植园，大农场 | |
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132
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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133
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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134
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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135
felon
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| n.重罪犯；adj.残忍的 | |
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136
eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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137
dissenting
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| adj.不同意的 | |
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138
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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139
statutes
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| 成文法( statute的名词复数 )； 法令； 法规； 章程 | |
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140
repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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141
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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142
indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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143
maliciously
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| adv.有敌意地 | |
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144
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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145
stigma
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| n.耻辱，污名；(花的)柱头 | |
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146
penal
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| adj.刑罚的；刑法上的 | |
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147
reprobation
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| n.斥责 | |
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148
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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149
infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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150
triumphantly
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| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
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151
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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152
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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153
serenity
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| n.宁静，沉着，晴朗 | |
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154
denomination
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| n.命名，取名，(度量衡、货币等的)单位 | |
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155
stimulating
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| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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156
acumen
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| n.敏锐，聪明 | |
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157
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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158
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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159
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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160
nonchalance
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| n.冷淡，漠不关心 | |
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161
contraction
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| n.缩略词，缩写式，害病 | |
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162
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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163
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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164
deriving
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| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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165
precepts
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| n.规诫，戒律，箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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166
simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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167
implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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168
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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169
reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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170
obnoxious
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| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
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171
abhorrence
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| n.憎恶；可憎恶的事 | |
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172
compassionate
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| adj.有同情心的，表示同情的 | |
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173
infraction
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| n.违反；违法 | |
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174
amenable
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| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
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175
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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176
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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177
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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178
purport
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| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
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179
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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180
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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181
lament
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| n.悲叹，悔恨，恸哭；v.哀悼，悔恨，悲叹 | |
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182
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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183
reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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184
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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185
unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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186
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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187
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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188
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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189
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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190
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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191
abrogating
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| 废除（法律等）( abrogate的现在分词 )； 取消； 去掉； 抛开 | |
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192
absolving
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的现在分词 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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193
aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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194
provocations
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| n.挑衅( provocation的名词复数 )；激怒；刺激；愤怒的原因 | |
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195
stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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196
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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197
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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198
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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199
disclaims
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| v.否认( disclaim的第三人称单数 ) | |
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200
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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201
dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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202
verbiage
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| n.冗词；冗长 | |
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203
sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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204
dissimulation
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| n.掩饰，虚伪，装糊涂 | |
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205
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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206
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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207
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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208
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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209
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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210
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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211
blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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212
perpetuated
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| vt.使永存（perpetuate的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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